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WHAT ISSUES LIE AHEAD FOR THE SUPEME COURT?
The Usual Suspects -And a Few New Faces
Matthew Frey *
Amid a Supreme Court era labeled "conservative" for both the tenor and small number
of the Court's recent opinions, many commentators expect the Justices soon to take up cases
involving a wide range of controversies, including a few the Court has never addressed
before.
Affirmative action, censorship of the Internet, and a person's right to own a gun top the
list of topics likely headed once again for High Court scrutiny, while questions about school
voucher programs, federal hate-crimes laws, and government control over the export of
computer encryption software lead the issues up for first-time review.
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SCHOOL VOUCHERS
Matthew Frey *
By refusing last year to hear an appeal from a Wisconsin Supreme Court decision that
upheld Milwaukee's ambitious school voucher plan, the Supreme Court has left
commentators wondering whether it agreed with the Wisconsin court or whether it is simply
looking for a better case on which to rule. If the latter is true, court-watchers believe the
Justices will have no trouble picking a case more to their liking, although it may take up to
five years for one to reach the stage at which it is deemed ready for their review.
Disagreement over the constitutionality of voucher programs has sparked court cases in
Ohio, Florida, Maine, and Vermont, and others are sure to follow in the wake of increasing
interest in voucher programs among state and local governments.
Vouchers programs involve government-sponsored plans that provide parents with the
option of sending their children to private schools at taxpayer expense. Proponents of these
plans herald the choices they provide to parents looking to provide their children with the
best education possible. They point out that vouchers represent a way to help mostly poor
and minority children escape chronically underfunded public schools. Their adversaries
counter by saying that the money devoted to voucher programs is better spent on improving
the public schools themselves. Questions about public support of religious schools
complicate things even more.
Despite their disagreements, most involved in the issue believe that the Supreme Court is
destined to have the last word.
"There will be a showdown," Barry W. Lynn, executive director of Americans United for
Separation of Church and State.
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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GROUPS SEEK TO STOP VOUCHER PROGRAM THROUGH
LAWSUIT
USA Today
Wednesday, July 21, 1999
Stephaan Harris
Education and civil liberties groups
filed suit in federal court Tuesday to halt
new legislation that resurrected
Cleveland's 3-year-old school voucher
program.
Almost two months ago, the program
seemed dead when the Ohio Supreme
Court struck it down on technical
grounds.
The court said that because the
program was adopted as part of a
spending bill, it violated the Ohio
Constitution's "one subject rule." This
rule allows the state Legislature to address
only one issue for each bill that it
considers.
State legislators responded by drafting
a new bill, which the governor signed just
weeks ago, says Brian Perera, director of
finance for the Ohio Senate. Cleveland's
voucher program provides up to $ 2,250 a
year in financial aid for low-income
students to attend private, mostly
religious, schools. Nearly 3,700 students
received vouchers this past school year.
Perera says the bill allocates $ 11.2
million for the 1999-2000 school year and
more than $ 13.8 million for the 2000-
2001 school year.
The suit was filed in U.S. District
Court in Cleveland and names Susan
Zelman, the superintendent of public
instruction for the state's Education
department, as a defendant.
"We don't think taxpayers should be
forced to contribute hard-earned dollars
to any church school," says Barry Lynn,
executive director of Americans United
for Separation of Church and State. "In a
real sense, we are very pro-public schools,
and vouchers are a cancer on the efforts at
education reform."
Americans United for Separation of
Church and State, the American Civil
Liberties Union, the Ohio Education
Association and other groups are pushing
the litigation.
Florida also was slapped with a
lawsuit, led by the ACLU, for its new
statewide voucher program.
"We're supporting what the
Legislature recommends," says Monica
Zarichny, a spokeswoman for Zelman.
Copyright C 1999 Gannett Company, Inc.
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PUBLIC FUNDS TO PRIVATE SCHOOL
A Test Emerges
The Christian Science Monitor
May 10, 1999, Monday
Warren Richey, Staff Writer of The Christian Science Monitor
MIAMI - Florida is emerging as the
next major constitutional battleground
over whether using public tax dollars to
pay for parochial school tuition is a
violation of the separation of church and
state.
In late April, the state legislature in
Tallahassee adopted the nation's first
statewide school-voucher program, and
Gov. Jeb Bush (R) is expected to sign the
measure into law by early June.
It will become the most ambitious
school-voucher program adopted so far,
expanding on a similar voucher plan
already under way in Milwaukee.
"This is probably the most important
piece of education-reform legislation that
the country has ever seen," says Pat
Heffernan, president of Floridians for
School Choice.
But critics are asking, is it
constitutional?
Florida's so-called "A-plus" plan for
education sets up a grading system for
public schools throughout the state.
Parents of students at a school receiving a
grade of "F" for any two years in a four-
year period would be eligible to transfer
their children to a better school
including private, parochial schools. The
plan awards such parents state-issued
vouchers to cover tuition costs.
The central concern is that under the
First Amendment of the US Constitution,
government money cannot be used to
support parochial schools.
Voucher programs like the one in
Milwaukee and the proposed Florida plan
attempt to avoid this constitutional
prohibition by having the state turn over
voucher checks directly to parents. The
idea is that technically the money is no
longer public money but becomes the
private property of the parents to pay for
their child's education at a school of their
choice.
Parents can use the funds to send
their children to another public school, a
private, nonreligious school, or a private,
parochial school. Leaving the decision to
the parents, proponents say, insulates the
government from involvement in making
payments to religious schools.
Critics say this is little more than a
legal fig leaf. The money is still public
money, they say, and the voucher program
constitutes an illegal endorsement of
religion by the government.
Supporters of the plan disagree. They
say it enables low-income parents to
choose the school that is right for their
child, rather than encouraging the spread
or practice of religion. It injects a level of
accountability and competition into the
education system, they say, granting
parents the power to withdraw tuition
dollars from failing schools and spending
them instead in better schools.
"The public funds that we have
contributed for the education of children
belong to the children, not the system,"
says Mr. Heffernan. "If the system is
434
failing them then we are happy to have
the children take those funds elsewhere to
secure an education."
The US Supreme Court has never
addressed the issue of school vouchers
directly. Last fall, the high court declined
to hear arguments on both sides of the
Milwaukee voucher program. By refusing
to hear that case, the justices let stand a
Wisconsin Supreme Court decision that
found the voucher program did not
violate First Amendment principles.
Legal experts are divided over the
significance of the US Supreme Court's
decision not to hear the case last fall.
Voucher supporters see it as a green light
to expand voucher programs nationwide,
and efforts are under way across the
country to do exactly that.
Voucher critics counter that the
justices merely sidestepped the issue,
choosing to wait for a better case to settle
the contentious debate over school
vouchers.
Florida may provide that case. "There
will be a showdown," says Barry W. Lynn,
executive director of the Washington-
based advocacy group Americans United
for Separation of Church and State.
Mr. Lynn says it may take as long as
five years for the Florida plan and others
like it to work their way through various
court challenges to the US Supreme
Court. But he says the issue will inevitably
land there.
In addition to Florida, school
vouchers are a hot issue in Maine, Ohio,
and Vermont.
The Maine Supreme Court ruled two
weeks ago that school-voucher payments
to parochial schools would violate the US
Constitution. In that state, parents
receiving education vouchers may use
them only to pay tuition at another public
school or a private, nonreligious school.
A group of Maine parents sued the
state seeking to enroll their children in a
parochial school using state-issued
vouchers. They claimed the state's refusal
to permit them to send their children to
parochial schools under the state voucher
program was a violation of their right to
religious liberty.
The court ruled that the parents had a
right to send their children to a religious
school, but that they had no right to
expect the State of Maine to pay for it.
School-voucher cases are also pending
in Ohio and Vermont, with the supreme
courts in both those states expected to
rule within the next six weeks.
Copyright 1999 The Christian Science
Publishing Society
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STATE CONSTITUTION POSES HIGH HURDLES FOR
VOUCHER PROPOSAL
The New York Times
Friday, March 5, 1999
Alan Finder
Even if Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani
gains the Board of Education's approval
for an experimental school voucher
program, the idea of using public money
to send New York City school students to
private schools will still face serious, and
perhaps insurmountable, legal hurdles.
New York State's Constitution
specifically forbids public money to be
used "directly or indirectly" for schools
under the control of "any religious
denonination." The overwhelming
majority of private schools around the
country are religious, and in New York
most of those are Roman Catholic.
Moreover, opponents of the Mayor's
plan contended yesterday, the State
Legislature would have to approve the use
of public money just to send city school
students to nonsectarian private schools.
And senior Democrats in the State
Assembly made clear that no such law was
likely to be passed.
"Regardless of the Mayor's position,
regardless of what the Board of Education
might approve, the New York State
school system is a creation of the State
Legislature," said Steven Sanders, a
Manhattan Democrat who is chairman of
the Assembly's Committee on Education.
"There is no law now that allows for
vouchers.
"In order for this proposal to become
law, it requires more than a vote by the
Board of Education. It requires a vote by
the Legislature. And the Legislature is not
going to pass a law that will commit the
use of public money in vouchers for
private schools."
Mr. Giuliani has not explained why he
thinks the Board of Education has the
legal power to create a voucher program
on its own. But city lawyers said yesterday
that the state education law granted broad
powers to the board and the Schools
Chancellor, Dr. Rudy Crew.
"The education law is drafted very
broadly," said Jeffrey D. Friedlander, the
First Assistant Corporation Counsel. "It
gives the Chancellor the authority to
promote the best interest of the schools.
It gives the Chancellor the authority to
open new schools. We think no direct
legislation is necessary."
Mr. Friedlander did not address how
the Mayor's plan could be interpreted to
meet the restrictions of the State
Constitution. He acknowledged that
opponents of the plan would undoubtedly
file lawsuits to block an experiment with
vouchers, should a majority of the Board
of Education approve. The board appears
to be split evenly on the proposal, with
the deciding voter-Terri Thomson of
Queens-undecided. Ms. Thomson said
yesterday that she would not make up her
mind until late this month.
Several Board of Education officials
said they did not know how the voucher
plan could be interpreted to be in accord
with the State Constitution's ban.
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"Who died and left the Board of
Education king to create legislation?
Nobody," said a senior official of the
Board of Education, who spoke on the
condition of anonymity. "I understand
that the Mayor wants school vouchers,
and I'm sure he's sincere. But school
districts are not sovereign. This is the
policy purview of the Legislature."
In Milwaukee and Cleveland, public
school students have been using vouchers
to attend private schools. In both
instances, state legislatures approved bills
authorizing the programs, many experts
said. Legislatures in several states,
including Florida, Texas and Pennsylvania,
are debating whether to enact voucher
programs. In the last decade, voters in
California and Colorado have voted down
school vouchers in state referendums.
Many experts said they were unaware
of a city that had created a voucher
program on its own. "This is something
that always has been legislated," said Peter
W. Cookson Jr., director of educational
outreach and innovation at Teachers
College of Columbia University.
Joseph P Viteritti, director of the
program on education and civil society at
New York University, and several other
experts agreed that New York's
Constitution and the lack of legislation
would create legal problems for
proponents of vouchers in the city.
But Mr. Viteritti noted that in
upholding Wisconsin's school voucher
law, that state's Supreme Court said it met
constitutional principles because the
taxpayers' money did not go directly to
the private schools. Public money went,
instead, to students and parents, who
decided where the money would be spent.
The Wisconsin court also said that the
primary purpose of the voucher program
was secular, and that it neither promoted
nor inhibited religion.
Copyright C 1999 The New York Times
Company
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VOUCHERS LOOKING BETTER TO SOME BLACKS
The Houston Chronicle
Friday, June 4, 1999
Clarence Page
AN important crack has opened up in
black America's once-impenetrable wall of
resistance to school vouchers.
The eyebrow-raising split has opened
up in Miami between two of America's
oldest and most prominent civil rights
organizations.
In a move that pokes gaping holes in
the argument that publicly funded school
vouchers are a racist plot, the Urban
League of Greater Miami has retained a
Washington law firm to intervene in court
on behalf of a voucher plan passed by the
Florida Legislature and was supported by
Gov. Jeb Bush.
That puts the chapter on the opposite
side of the National Association for the
Advancement of Colored People, the
nation's oldest and largest civil rights
group, which has vowed to sue to block
the Bush voucher plan.
It also puts the Miami Urban League
chapter on the opposite side of its own
national organization and its respected
president, Hugh Price, longtime voucher
opponents.
T. Willard Fair, the Miami chapter's
president, refuses to knuckle under to talk
that his chapter has betrayed the race.
"We are not bound by color the way we
used to be bound. Where people said,
'You can't think that way because you're
black,' " Fair says.
Actually, if it were up to grass-roots,
rank-and-file African-Americans, Fair
apparently would find more friends than
foes.
In fact, surveys show that the more
we African-Americans learn about
vouchers, the better we seem to like them.
Some of us, anyway.
The racial angle is important in the
voucher debate, since a disproportionate
percentage of the nation's low-income
parents who would take advantage of
vouchers are poor, urban blacks and
Latinos.
The Bush plan, written to go into
effect in September, would permit
students from the lowest-rated public
schools in the state to attend private
schools, including religious schools, with $
4,000 vouchers per child paid by
taxpayers' money.
Voucher support has climbed so
much among African-Americans that
blacks are now more likely to support
them than whites are.
In a survey taken last year by the Joint
Center for Political and Economic
Studies, a black-oriented Washington
think tank, 48.1 percent of blacks favored
the use of state money for private school
tuition vouchers, while 39.8 percent
opposed it. Whites, by contrast, opposed
vouchers by a margin of 50.2 percent to
41.3 percent.
A closer look at black responses
reveals a glaring gap along income lines.
Poorer and less-educated blacks were
more likely to support vouchers than were
their more affluent, well-educated
counterparts.
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Blacks with college degrees opposed
vouchers by a 45.3 percent to 38.6 percent
margin, while blacks with "some college"
or other post-secondary vocational
education favored vouchers by 58.7 to
41.3. Those with high school diplomas or
less favored vouchers by 52.1 percent to
35.4 percent.
David Bositis, the Joint Center's
research director, attributes the class gap
to indications that better-educated blacks,
like better-educated whites, tend to be
more politically moderate and more
satisfied with the job their public schools
are doing.
"Moderate people have the most
misgivings about vouchers, which they see
as a radical solution," he says. "People
who are happy with their schools see
vouchers as a challenge to the status quo,
a challenge that possibly could hurt their
schools."
As a college-educated black parent
whose son attends a fine, racially
integrated, suburban public school, I have
an additional theory.
I think low-income people are most
concerned, for good reason, with helping
their own children get the best education
possible, while many of the rest of us are
more concerned with helping all children
get the best education possible.
I care not only about the few lucky
kids who can escape bad schools with
vouchers, whether publicly or privately
funded, but also about the kids who are
left behind after their former classmates
are spirited away, along with badly needed
taxpayers' dollars.
That's why, like many other taxpayers,
I have serious reservations about vouchers
as the salvation of America's complex
educational needs.
I would rather see Americans return
to their ancient commitment to quality
education for everyone, not just the most
fortunate and resourceful families.
Anything short of that will only invite
wider cracks in the wall.
Copyright C 1999 The Houston Chronicle
Publishing Company
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IRYASJOEL CONTINUES
Matthew Frey *
The Supreme Court's decision earlier this decade striking down a law creating a special
public school district for the town of Kiryas Joel did little to diminish the resolve of the
Hasidic community's citizens, whose efforts to create a special school district for their
disabled children touched off a legal battle that has resulted in ten state and federal court
rulings in as many years.
Most recently, a New York Court of Appeals opinion issued in May that struck down the
third effort by the people of Kiryas Joel to create a separate school district left the plaintiffs
to decide whether to appeal the state court's decision to the United States Supreme Court or
whether to go back to the legislative drawing board for a fourth time.
At least one citizen of the town seemed to favor an appeal.
"It's a 4-3 decision, which is better than it's ever been," said Abraham Weider, mayor of
Kiryas Joel, referring to the New York court's ruling.
Advocates of the plan to create a new school district argue that Kiryas Joel's 250
handicapped children feel out of place at the regional public schools they now attend.
Critics of the school plan within the town believe the plan is merely an attempt to hijack
millions of dollars of state and federal support to fund what will amount to a private
religious school system.
The recent state court opinion faulted the plan for its "primary effect of advancing
religion," a violation of the constitutional doctrine of the separation of church and state.
An appeal to the Supreme Court could come this term.
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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COURT DECISION UPSETS SCHOOL DISTRICT MEASURE FOR
KIRYAS JOEL
The New York Times
Wednesday, May 12,1999
Joseph Berger
New York State's highest court
yesterday declared unconstitutional the
third and latest legislative effort to create a
special public school district for the
disabled children of the Hasidic village of
Kiryas Joel, saying that it still amounted to
"preferring one religion over others."
But a vigorous dissent by three judges
of the State Court of Appeals suggested
that the decade-old case, which has
produced 10 court rulings, was not over.
"The intractable drama of this dispute
has a David and Goliath staging to it-yet
it is difficult to decide who will be left
standing in the end as the true victor or
hero," Judge Joseph W. Bellacosa said.
Abraham Weider, the Mayor of Kiryas
Joel, a village of 15,000 Satmar Hasidic
Jews in Orange County, said it was
considering appealing for a second time to
the United States Supreme Court or
returning to the State Legislature for a
fourth time.
In 1989, Kiryas Joel persuaded the
Legislature to carve out a special public
school district from surrounding Monroe-
Woodbury, contending that the village's
250 handicapped children felt
uncomfortable attending secular classes.
The Legislature's first law was
declared unconstitutional by several
courts, including the Supreme Court,
which found that the law written explicitly
for Kiryas Joel by name amounted to a
favor for a single religious group. The
Legislature's second effort, in 1994, did
not name Kiryas Joel but was thrown out
by succeeding courts because the law's
criteria of wealth and population applied
only to Kiryas Joel.
In 1997, the Legislature tried for a
third time and slightly broadened the
criteria. But the lower courts found that
this version applied to only two of the
state 1,545 municipalities-Kiryas Joel
and the town of Stony Point in Rockland
County. Yesterday, a four-judge majority
of the Court of Appeals agreed, finding
that the law, known as Chapter 390, did
not meet the Supreme Court's test of
neutrality toward religion.
"The conclusion is inescapable that
Chapter 390 has the primary effect of
advancing religion and constitutes an
impermissible accommodation," Judge
George Bundy Smith wrote for the
majority. Proposing an alternative, he
pointed out that public school teachers,
after a 1997 Supreme Court decision, were
now permitted to enter parochial schools
or yeshivas to deliver remedial or special
education classes and could now enter
Kiryas Joel's religious schools.
In his dissent, Judge Bellacosa argued
that in assessing constitutionality, the
court must give the Legislature the benefit
of the doubt. The 1997 law, he said, was
written with two secular purposes-to
create new school districts and provide
secular education for children of Kiryas
Joel, which he emphasized is a municipal
village, not a religious entity. Nothing is
wrong, he said, with passing a law that
441
benefits a single municipality so long as
the language is broad enough to cover
other communities.
Kiryas Joel's residents, the judge said,
"simply took their place in the long line of
supplicants walking and working the
corridors of power in the Statehouse." It
is not, he said, "un-American or
unconstitutional to refuse to be absorbed
into the melting pot."
Mayor Weider, a businessman who
has led the battle to sustain the public
school, was heartened by the dissent. "It's
a 4-3 decision, which is better than it's
ever been," he said.
But Joseph Waldman, a Kiryas Joel
dissident who opposes the school, said the
village was also trying to retain control of
the school taxes its residents pay and
millions of dollars in Federal and state
programs for remedial, bilingual and
transportation programs.
If the Legislature and the Supreme
Court refuse to intervene, the State
Education Department could close the
district in the next few weeks and force
the surrounding Monroe-Woodbury
district to provide special education
classes for the handicapped at the village's
religious schools, said Jay Worona, general
counsel for the New York State School
Boards Association, which brought the
litigation against Kiryas Joel.
Monroe-Woodbury, however, has
resisted absorbing Kiryas Joel because it
would add a large bloc of voters who do
not send children to public schools and
might stymie spending increases.
Gov. George E. Pataki, who
supported the latest Kiryas Joel legislation,
declined comment. Pat Lynch, speaking
for Assembly Speaker Sheldon Silver, said
Mr. Silver was "committed to finding a
mechanism" to meet "the educational
needs of this group of disabled
youngsters."
Copyright C 1999 The New York Times
Company
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BAKKE REDUX?
Matthew Frey *
Cases in Washington and Michigan stand an equal chance of prompting the Supreme
Court to revisit a 1978 decision in which it held that college and university admissions
offices could consider race as a "plus factor" in trying to achieve "educational diversity,"
commentators suggest. That case, University of Cakfornia v. Bakke, arose when a white man
challenged the admissions policies of the University of California system after he was denied
admission to UC-Davis's medical school in favor of sixteen minorities whose credentials
failed to match his own.
In the over twenty years since, colleges and universities have stood behind the Bakke
ruling in the face of criticism that preferential treatment for minorities amounts to racism.
Critics of preferential admissions policies in the University of Texas system won a significant
victory in 1996, however, when the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in the Hopwood case
that such policies were unconstitutional. More recently, the First Circuit Court of Appeals
struck down preferential admissions practices at the Boston Latin School, that city's most
prestigious public high school.
The Washington case centers on Katuria Smith, a white woman who filed suit after she
was denied admission to the University of Washington's law school. She claims to have
been passed over in favor of African-Americans and Hispanics with lower test scores. The
Michigan cases stem from similar challenges mounted by three white applicants to the
University of Michigan.
At the center of all three lawsuits is the Center for Individual Rights, the conservative
law firm which successfully represented Cheryl Hopwood in Texas. It anticipates equal
success in the current cases.
"It's a sleeper nationally," said Michael Greve, the Center's executive director, referring
to Smith's case. "(It) will be the next shoe to drop."
Critics of the Hopwood ruling predicted the Fifth Circuit's decision would spell the end of
minority enrollments throughout public colleges and universities in Texas, and for a time it
looked as though they might be right. But admissions officials in Texas estimate that more
minorities will enroll at the University of Texas this year than in 1996, the year before
Hopwood went into effect. The influence of the First Circuit's opinion on minority
enrollment at Boston Latin is unknown.
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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UW CASE MAY ALTER ADMISSIONS POLICIES
Challenge Being Closely Watched by Universities
Seattle Post-Intelligencer
Thursday, July 8,1999
Heath Foster, P-I Reporter
The most significant court ruling in
the national legal struggle over affirmative
action may come out of a
reverse-discrimination case against the
University of Washington.
Katuria Smith, the reluctant poster
child of last year's Initiative 200 campaign,
sued the UW Law School in 1997,
claiming she was rejected to make room
for blacks and Hispanics with lower test
scores.
Her case hasn't yet gone to trial. The
9th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals in San
Francisco must first rule on whether it
was constitutional for the UW to use the
goal of a racially diverse student body as
the basis for race-based admissions
decisions.
"It's a sleeper nationally, with nobody
paying much attention to it, but (the UW
vs. Smith case) will be the next shoe to
drop," said Michael Greve, the executive
director of the Center for Individual
Rights, a conservative, Washington,
D.C.-based law firm.
CIR is handling Smith's case and two
other high-profile challenges to similar
admissions policies at the University of
Michigan.
The 9th Circuit's decision could affect
whether the U.S. Supreme Court weighs
in on a growing stack of conflicting
rulings on the constitutionality of
admissions policies that make being a
minority an advantage.
At issue is Smith's appeal of U.S.
District Court Judge Thomas Zilly's
February ruling that the U.S. Supreme
Court's landmark reverse-discrimination
ruling in the University of California vs.
Bakke applies to Smith's case.
In the 1978 Bakke case, Justice Lewis
Powell concluded that maintaining
separate admission tracks for whites and
minorities was illegal, as were racial quotas
or set-asides. But Powell said it was
constitutional for a university to try to
attain "educational diversity" by using race
as a "plus factor."
The Bakke opinion has been used by
universities nationally as the foundation
for affirmative action policies.
But recent appellate court rulings have
contradicted Bakke. In CIR's best-known
victory, the 1996 Hopwood case, the 5th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that
the University of Texas' policies to boost
enrollment of blacks and Hispanics were
unconstitutional. The court held that
diversity alone did not justify the school's
racial preferences, and such preferences
were allowed only as a remedy for the
continuing effects of specific past
discrimination.
More recently, the 1st Circuit Court of
Appeals ruled the race-based admission
policies at a prestigious public high
school, the Boston Latin School, weren't
constitutional. The school used race as a
factor in the admission of half of its
students, along with grades and test
scores.
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At the urging of the NAACP and the
U.S. Department of Education, Boston
school district officials recently backed
away from a decision to appeal the case to
the Supreme Court. They feared the
conservative high court would uphold the
Boston case, making any school district in
the nation that uses any type of race-based
student assignments vulnerable to
challenges. With the end of mandatory
busing in many states, race-based
assignments have become a popular tool
for promoting racially balanced schools,
and Seattle is no exception.
If the 9th Circuit upholds Zilly's
ruling, it would directly conflict with the
5th Circuit's Hop wood decision. And only
the U.S. Supreme Court could resolve the
conflict.
Ironically, the 9th Circuit ruling won't
impact admission policies at public
universities in Washington or California.
1-200 and California's Proposition 209
have eliminated the application
preferences public universities gave to
minority groups.
Copyright ( 1999
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MICHIGAN CASE DRAWING NATIONAL ATTENTION
The Associated Press
Saturday, July 3, 1999
Justin Hyde, Associated Press Writer
ANN ARBOR, Mich. (AP) -
The legal fight between the University of
Michigan and three while applicants over
the use of race in admissions has drawn
the attention of educators
across the country - and could set a
precedent for the rest of the nation.
"It is a case that very well may go up
to the Supreme Court," said Gary Orfield,
a Harvard professor of education and
social policy. "There's major intellectual
preparation on both sides. It has every
possibility of being truly historic."
The University of Michigan seems to
be treating it that way. The university
expects to spend more than $3 million on
its case, which it is building on data that it
says show affirmative action benefits not
only minority applicants, but all students.
"Race is so significant in American
life, its history, its culture," said Michigan
President Lee Bollinger. "It's been so
central to the evolution of the country.
"Living with the issue of race in an
educational context raises questions for
students about how you understand the
world from the issue of race."
The university's detailed response,
Orfield said, is novel.
"Most of these cases have not
involved that kind of organized evidence
or development," he said. "I think the
University of Michigan has really turned
some of its resources into looking at its
own racial issues and the consequences of
its own politics."
The main legal dispute involves a
complicated 1978 Supreme Court decision
that universities have relied on to set up
affirmative action programs.
The case involved Allan Bakke, a
white applicant to the University of
California-Davis' medical school. When
he applied in 1973 and 1974, the school
had 16 of its 100 entering class spots
reserved for "qualified" minorities. Bakke
was turned down twice, even though his
grades and test scores exceeded those of
any minority who was admitted.
The court split its decision 4-4, with
Justice Lewis Powell writing an opinion
that straddled both sides and a single
paragraph that universities have relied on
since. He said the university was wrong
to set aside seats or use racial quotas, but
could not take race into account when
selecting students.
Most if not all four-year public
universities have adopted some form of
affirmative action based on the Bakke
case, said Hector Garza, vice president for
access and equity programs at the
American Council on Education.
"We in the higher education
community are very concerned about any
Michigan ruling," he said. "We are
concerned because we firmly believe that
there is still a need for programs that seek
to provide access and opportunities to
students of color and women."
Michigan was chosen as the target of
the lawsuits because its methods were
revealed to the public, said Terence Pell,
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the senior counsel for the Center for
Individual Rights, the group behind the
lawsuits.
A Michigan philosophy professor,
Carl Cohen, used the Freedom of
Information Act in 1997 to get the grids
used by the university in its admissions
policies. State lawmakers called Cohen to
testify, and later contacted the Center for
Individual Rights.
The center gained fame from its
handling of the case of Cheryl Hopwood,
a white Texas woman who was denied
admission to the University of Texas Law
School. In 1996, the 5 U.S. Circuit Court
of Appeals in New Orleans ruled that
Texas had no reason to use race
in admissions - and ruled that Bakke
didn't apply in its three-state region of
Texas, Louisiana, and Mississippi.
The Supreme Court chose not to hear
the case, saying Texas had already ended
its affirmative action policies. From 1995
to 1997, enrollment of black and Hispanic
students decreased from 19 percent to 14
percent of total enrollment at the
University of Texas.
Similar drops in enrollment were
noted in California, after a voter initiative
outlawed the use of race in admissions
there.
Michigan wants to show through
scientific studies that diversity improves
education.
One Michigan professor, Patricia
Gurmi, analyzed data from about 10,000
students and concluded that those who
were exposed to more diversity in
classrooms and on campus do better in
life.
"Majority and minority individuals
whose childhood experiences take place in
schools and neighborhoods that are
largely segregated are likely to lead their
adult lives in largely segregated ...
settings," Gurin wrote.
"College is a uniquely opportune time
to disrupt this pattern."
Experts William Bowen and Derek
Bok found that minorities who had been
admitted to selective schools under
affirmative action policies were just as
likely to succeed as other students. They
also said ending racial preferences would
reverse the outcome.
"Of the more than 700 black students
who would have been rejected in 1976
under a race-neutral standard, more than
225 went on to earn doctorates or degrees
in law, medicine or business," they said.
"The average earning of all 700
exceeds $71,000, and well over 300 are
leaders of civic organizations."
The Center for Individual Rights has
argued that Michigan's system is illegal
under Bakke because it relies too much on
race - and that Bakke should be read as
only allowing racial preferences to cure
specific cases of discrimination.
"The Michigan case is clearly illegal
under existing Supreme Court
precedents," Pell said.
"It's about as clear a case of what
Justice Powell said you could not do as
there is. If anything, it's the University of
Michigan trying to overrule Bakke."
But Bollinger, who is also a lawyer,
says Michigan's policies were written to
pass Bakke's tests.
Diversity, he says, is just as important
to a college education as teaching James
Joyce or Shakespeare.
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"Part of a great education is realizing
you thought things were a certain way,
and it turns out they're not," Bollinger
said.
Copyright © 1999.
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HIGH-SCHOOLERS IN UT PROGRAM GET TASTE OF COLLEGE
Longhorn Round- Up Aims to Recruit Top Scholars From Across Texas,
with Focus on Minorities
Austin American-Statesman
Thursday, June 17, 1999
Peyton D. Woodson
Julie Cantu, a high school senior from
Pharr, said she looks forward to being the
first in her family to graduate from
college.
Unlike many seniors embarking on
that last year of high school, she's not
worried about SAT scores or passing
admission requirements. Cantu says that's
because of her five-year involvement with
University Outreach, a program geared
toward getting students, with an emphasis
on those from mostly minority schools,
ready for college.
"Without University Outreach, I
would have to prepare for college on my
own," Cantu said. "They have SAT
workshops and things to help us in
college. My counselors at school are
basically just concerned with scheduling
classes."
Cantu was one of 180 Texas high
school juniors and seniors that visited the
University of Texas campus Tuesday and
Wednesday as part of the school's
Longhorn Round-Up recruitment
program.
The program designed for University
Outreach students allowed them to attend
workshops by the admissions and
financial aid offices and UT colleges, tour
the campus, use campus sports and
entertainment facilities, stay over night in
dorms and meet with university students.
"We want them to get an idea of what
college life is about," said Yolanda Easley,
assistant director of the Austin University
Outreach office. "It's a totally different
environment."
And at a time when universities such
as UT are struggling to recruit more
minority students, university officials see
the outreach program as a way to attract
some top scholars and increase diversity.
"Longhorn Round-Up provides
exposure for some students who might
not have known about UT," said Wanda
Nelson, director of the Austin University
Outreach office.
The nonprofit group has six offices
throughout Texas that are run by UT and
Texas A&M University officials, but the
group does not recruit for a particular
school. Students from grades eight to 12
routinely participate in the program,
which started in 1987.
"The impetus at that time was to
increase the number of African American
and Hispanic students continuing to
college," Nelson said.
"It's very important to continue to
promote this program so that they are
prepared for jobs available in the next
century."
As a result of the Hopwood legal
decision, which eliminated race-based
admissions in Texas state schools, UT was
one of a number of schools that saw an
immediate dip in freshman enrollment of
minority students.
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Texas college officials now are
realizing that more emphasis must be
placed on minority student recruitment in
order to keep and raise the number of
those students entering and graduating.
Nelson said university outreach can
become a leader in that effort. Even
before Hopwood, she said, the program was
open to all students but targeted schools
with high numbers of minority students -
many of whom would be first-generation
college students.
In 1996, 266 African American and
932 Hispanic students entered UT as
freshmen. In 1997, the year the Hopwood
decision went into effect, enrollment of
African Americans dropped to 190 and
Hispanics to 892. This fall, officials
estimate 267 African American students
and 978 Hispanic students will enroll at
UT.
Nelson credits a host of initiatives,
including the outreach program, with the
rise in UT's minority enrollment even
after Hopwood.
The students say they realize the
value of their time with the program.
"They helped me to look past just
athletic scholarships and to look further
into my academics and to get more
involved in school," said Latoria Randile,
a junior from Houston. "It gives you an
insight in what you need to prepare for. I
know a lot of students out there that don't
have this opportunity."
Copyright © 1999
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THE VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN ACT STRUCK DOWN
Are Hate Crimes Next?
Matthew Frey *
The White House and the National Organization of Women have petitioned the
Supreme Court to overturn a Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals decision that struck down the
Violence Against Women Act, a law Congress passed in 1994 with the aim of providing
victims of rape and domestic violence with standing to sue their attackers in federal court.
In a 7-4 decision, the Fourth Circuit held that the Act was an impermissible extension of
Congress's power to regulate interstate commerce, a holding common among today's
increasingly activist conservative federal courts. Lawyers arguing on behalf of the Act
asserted that Congress was within the scope of the Commerce Clause in passing the measure
because sex-based violence leads to legal and medical costs, inhibits victims from traveling,
and reduces worker productivity.
The case arose shortly after Congress passed the Act when Christy Brzonkala, then a 17-
year-old freshman at Virginia Tech, reported to school officials that two of the school's
football players had raped her. After the officials failed to punish the players to Brzonkala's
satisfaction, Brzonkala took the case to federal court.
Commentators believe that the Supreme Court's decision in the case will determine
whether federal hate-crimes laws, close cousins of the Violence Against Women Act, may
stand.
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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LAW ALLOWING RAPE SUITS RULED UNCONSTITUTIONAL
The Boston Globe
Saturday, March 6, 1999
Jean McNair, Associated Press
RICHMOND - For the first time, a
federal appeals court yesterday declared
unconstitutional a 1994 federal law that
allows rape victims to sue their attackers
for violating their civil rights.
Ruling 7-4 in the case of a Virginia
Tech student who sued two football
players, the 4th US Circuit Court of
Appeals called the Violence Against
Women Act a "sweeping intrusion" into
matters traditionally handled by states.
The court said Congress overreached in
its attempt to regulate interstate
commerce when it passed the law.
The ruling is binding only in Virginia,
West Virginia, Maryland, and the
Carolinas.
A lower court judge had previously
thrown out the lawsuit of the Virginia
student, Christy Brzonkala, who was the
first person to sue under the Violence
Against Women Act. Eileen Wagner, one
of Brzonkala's lawyers, said she expects
the case to go to the Supreme Court.
"They can either give it a thumbs-up -
in which case people will use this law,
which they are reluctant to do now - or a
thumbs-down, which would encourage
Congress to go back to the drawing board
and rewrite the thing," Wagner said.
Brzonkala said she was raped in a
dormitory. She did not report the alleged
rape for several months and no criminal
charges were filed against the two players,
Antonio Morrison and James Crawford.
Their lawyers did not return calls
seeking comment.
Brzonkala's lawyers defended the
Violence Against Women Act by arguing
that gender-motivated violence affects
commerce by imposing medical and legal
costs on victims, inhibiting travel by those
who fear violence, and lessening
productivity.
The appeals court rejected that line of
reasoning. "Such a statute, we are
constrained to conclude, simply cannot be
reconciled with the principles of limited
federal government upon which this
nation is founded," Circuit Judge J.
Michael Luttig said.
Copyright C 1999 Globe Newspaper
Company
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NEW CONSERVATIVE ACTIVISM SWEEPS THE FEDERAL
COURTS
GOP- Appointed Jurists Back States' Powers; Strike Rules on Clean Air,
Youth Smoking, Rape Victims'Right to Sue
Los Angeles Times
Tuesday, June 22,1999
David G. Savage, Times Staff Writer
As a 17-year-old freshman at Virginia
Tech University, Christy Brzonkala turned
first to school disciplinary authorities with
her charge that two star football players
had raped her.
But they threw out the case against
one of the players for lack of evidence,
and sentenced the other to a "deferred
suspension" that would take effect only
when his football career was over.
So Brzonkala went to the federal
courts, relying on the brand-new Violence
Against Women Act. Not only did she fail
to prevail, but the appeals court in
Richmond, Va., threw out the law as an
unconstitutional intrusion into states'
rights.
That March 5 decision reflects a new
conservative activism sweeping the federal
courts now that judges appointed by the
last two Republican presidents, Reagan
and Bush, constitute the majority of
federal judges.
Not long ago, Republicans decried
activist judges for overstepping their
authority and, in effect, making law from
the bench. Conservatives complained that
an elitist, unelected judiciary had assumed
too much power: ordering nationwide
school desegregation in the 1950s,
throwing out state-sponsored prayers in
public schools in the 1960s and striking
down all the laws that made abortion a
crime in the 1970s.
Now the roles are reversed. In recent
years, the Supreme Court has thrown out
federal laws intended to regulate handgun
purchases and possession of guns in
schools. In the last year alone,
conservative judges have knocked down
Clinton administration regulations on
youth smoking and clean air.
This week, as the Supreme Court's
current term wraps up, the justices will
decide whether to extend the principle of
"state sovereign immunity" to shield
states from federal suits charging patent
and copyright infringement.
Most legal scholars agree that the
recent federal court rulings signal a
fundamental shift in the balance of power
between Washington and the states.
When Reagan and Bush were elected
in 1980, they pledged to appoint cautious
judges who would enforce the laws as
written. Judges must "not legislate from
the bench," Bush said.
Over their 12 years in office, Reagan
and Bush appointed a majority of the 843
currently serving federal judges, including
five of the nine Supreme Court justices.
With little fanfare or public notice,
conservative judges-most of them
appointed by Reagan or Bush-have
struck down an array of liberal laws and
regulations during the last two years, not
only on gun control and smoking but on
453
drivers' privacy, religious liberty, age
discrimination and women's rights.
Yale law professor Akhil Amar said
the Supreme Court had "put the pincers
on federal power. The tone of these
opinions is rather dismissive of Congress
and the president." He noted that while
the Supreme Court under Chief Justice
Earl Warren in the 1960s was known for
its activism, "rarely did that court strike
down an act of Congress."
But University of Utah professor
Michael McConnell, a former Reagan
administration lawyer, praised the recent
rulings as faithful to the Constitution.
"I see this as a revitalization of the
principle that the federal government's
power is limited," McConnell said. "As
for the Violence Against Women Act, it is
a popular bit of symbolic legislation, but
it's hard to defend under the court's
current precedents."
The Violence Against Women Act
gives victims of sexual assault the right to
sue their attackers in federal court.
The Brzonkala case is not the only
recent case in which the Richmond
appeals court has exercised what Judge J.
Michael Luttig, a Bush appointee, has
described as its "affirmative constitutional
obligation to safeguard the sovereignty of
the states against congressional
encroachment."
Last August, the same court struck
down the Clinton administration's
campaign against youth smoking, ruling
that federal regulators had no authority
over tobacco.
In September, the Richmond-based
court struck down the 1994 Drivers'
Privacy Protection Act, which bars states
from selling personal data from drivers'
records, such as names, phone numbers
and street addresses. Congress had
responded to the 1989 murder of Los
Angeles actress Rebecca Schaeffer, who
was killed by a stalker who had obtained
her home address from the state
Department of Motor Vehicles.
The Supreme Court will hear the
Clinton administration's appeals in both
the tobacco and the drivers' privacy cases
in the fall. But the biggest constitutional
showdown is likely to occur over the
Violence Against Women Act.
By the end of the month, the Clinton
administration and the Legal Defense
Fund for the National Organization for
Women will appeal Brzonkala's case to
the Supreme Court, seeking to have the
law revived. The case, which will probably
be heard in the new term beginning in
October, sets the stage for a major battle
over whether Congress has the power to
enact national hate-crimes laws.
On nearly unanimous votes in both
the House and the Senate, Congress
enacted the law in the summer of 1994 on
the heels of a series of stories about
women who had been battered by
husbands or boyfriends, college students
who had been raped by their dates, and
working women who feared leaving their
jobs at night.
Sexual assaults often go unpunished,
lawmakers found, particularly when the
victim knows her attacker. And rarely, if
ever, can victims obtain compensation for
the damages they suffer.
All Americans have "a right to be free
from crimes of violence motivated by
gender," Congress declared in passing the
act.
Just four weeks later, Brzonkala was
allegedly raped by two football players in a
dormitory room. She says she then cut off
her hair, became depressed and suicidal
and hid in her room. She did not report
the incident to the police. Only after six
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months did she tell a counselor what had
happened.
Rape and sexual assault are the only
violent felonies the university does not
automatically report to the police. Instead,
a hearing was held before a university
officer in May 1995. Tony Morrison, the
starting linebacker for Virginia Tech, was
found guilty and suspended.
But his family hired a lawyer who
pointed out that the campus policy on
sexual assaults was not part of the student
handbook in September 1994, and the
university agreed to hold a new hearing
during the summer. When Brzonkala
returned home from a family vacation in
August, she was stunned to learn that
Morrison's suspension had been
overturned. He would be back to play
football in the fall.
"They didn't call me or send me a
note. Nothing," she said. "And they said
he was just guilty of verbal abuse." She
did not return to school.
After her story exploded in the college
newspaper, the state opened an
investigation but decided not to charge
Morrison.
"Whatever occurred between these
two folks was consensual," said David
Paxton, a Roanoke, Va., lawyer who
represented Morrison. He too left the
university and played out his football
career at a small college in eastern
Virginia, Paxton said.
With no other remedy available,
Brzonkala filed a civil suit in the federal
courts, only to see the U.S. 4th Circuit
Court of Appeals throw out the entire law.
Judge Luttig began his opinion: "We the
people, distrustful of power, and believing
that government limited and dispersed
protects freedom best. . . ."
Brzonkala's reaction to the appeals
court ruling: "I felt like I had been raped
again."
Copyright C 1999 Times Mirror Company
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ACLU v. RENO II
Matthew Frey *
On the heels of its victory before the Supreme Court two years ago in Reno v. ACLU, the
American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU) is back in court fighting Congressional attempts to
censor the Internet.
The Reno Court said that provisions of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) meant
to shield children from Internet pornography violated the First Amendment. Now in
pretrial stages, the present case stems from the ACLU's challenge to the Child Online
Protection Act (COPA), Congress's 1998 attempt to accommodate the Reno Court's opinion.
The law would punish operators of commercial Web sites who make available to children
under 17 sexually explicit material deemed harmful to minors.
The ACLU and its backers in the lawsuit, who won a preliminary injunction against
COPA last February, are concerned that "harmful to minors" is no more concrete a standard
than "indecent," with which the Supreme Court found fault in Reno. They are also fearful
that social conservatives could exploit COPA and prosecute any Web site whose content
they disfavor.
Proponents of COPA, however, liken the law's effect to an "electronic brown paper
bag" covering the offending Web sites.
"Playboy and Penthouse are protected speech for adults, but not kids," said Shyla Welch,
a spokeswoman for Enough Is Enough, a family oriented anti-pornography organization.
"We just want to extend those same laws to cyberspace."
Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the new litigation is the question it raises about
how to enforce what amounts to a national obscenity standard, something the Supreme
Court has never addressed.
COPA threatens to "stand decades of obscenity law on its ear," said Rachelle Chong, a
lawyer and former commissioner at the Federal Communications Commission.
A full trial in ACLU v. Reno II, as the case has been dubbed, likely won't begin until later
this fall.
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
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LAW BARRED SHIELDING KIDS FROM NET PORN
The San Francisco Chronicle
Tuesday, February 2, 1999
Jon Swartz, Chronicle Staff Writer
In a victory for free-speech advocates
and another blow to anti-cyberporn
lobbyists, a federal judge yesterday
blocked the government's latest attempt
to shield children from pornography on
the Internet.
U.S. District Judge Lowell Reed of
Philadelphia continued a preliminary
injunction against the Child Online
Protection Act, which would require U.S.
commercial Web sites with sexual content
deemed "harmful to minors" to block
access to those under 18 by using a credit
card or age-verification system.
Reed had issued a temporary
restraining order in November against the
act that expired at midnight last night.
"Perhaps we do the minors of this
country harm if First Amendment
protections, which they will with age
inherit fully, are chipped away in the name
of their protection," Reed said in a
strongly worded 49-page opinion.
Plaintiffs led by the American Civil
Liberties Union had pressed Reed during
a six-day hearing last month to extend the
preliminary injunction blocking the act's
enforcement, paving the way for a full trial
to have the law overturned.
A judge's clerk said the injunction
would remain in place until the ACLU
case reaches trial. A court date is expected
this spring.
"This proves that the statute was
unconstitutional and ineffectual," said
Alan Davidson, staff counsel of the
Center for Democracy and Technology,
an online civil liberties group in
Washington that also filed a brief
objecting to the act.
A spokesman for the Justice
Department, which could appeal the
decision, said government lawyers "are
reviewing the judge's decision."
"We're disappointed but not
surprised," said Shyla Welch, a
spokeswoman for Enough Is Enough, an
Internet safety organization in Fairfax, Va.
"This bipartisan law had broad public
support. It's a perfect example of the
ACLU trying to foist its agenda on the
rest of us."
Though passed overwhelmingly by
Congress and signed into law by President
Clinton in October, the controversial law
has yet to go into effect.
The act is a watered-down successor
to the Communications Decency Act,
which was struck down by the U.S.
Supreme Court on First Amendment
grounds in 1997.
The new law is more narrowly
focused, however, because it applies only
to commercial Web sites and tries to
clearly define objectionable material.
Authors of the bill identify "objectionable
sexual material" as lacking "serious
literary, artistic, political or scientific
value" for those under 18. Web operators
who violate the law could get up to six
months in jail and a $50,000 fine.
Proponents say the law is necessary to
shield children from a myriad of graphic
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sexual images and obscene material readily
available on the World Wide Web.
In arguments before Reed last week,
the Justice Department said the law is
merely an "electronic brown paper bag"
for Web sites that peddle X-rated material.
"COPA is concerned with what's
clearly pornographic. Those who are there
to excite, entice and fill their coffers,"
Justice attorney Karen Stewart said in the
government's closing argument last week.
"Playboy and Penthouse are
protected speech for adults, but not kids,"
Welch said. "We just want to extend those
same laws to cyberspace."
But critics of the law said it violates
the First Amendment and could be
exploited by social conservatives to
prosecute AIDS activists, abortion groups,
artists or gays who distribute information
over the World Wide Web.
"It should be up to parents, and not
the government, to decide what children
should see," ACLU staff counsel Chris
Hansen said. "This case was about
speech."
Others-such as Donna Hoffman, a
Vanderbilt University professor who is an
expert on e-commerce-said the law
might inadvertently endanger mainstream
commercial sites.
Rachelle Chong, a former Federal
Communications Commission
commissioner and partner at Coudert
Bros. in San Francisco, added that the law
threatened to "stand decades of obscenity
law on its ear" because it set a national-
rather than local--obscenity standard.
The U.S. Supreme Court has never
approved a national standard before.
Parents would be better off if they
opted for commercially available filtering
software to protect children from online
pornography rather than accept an "ill-
conceived law that limits the rights of
adults to free speech," Jerry Berman,
executive director of the CDT, said.
The ACLU spearheaded a coalition of
17 businesses and organizations-among
them, Salon, an online magazine; local
poet Lawrence Ferlinghetti; Planet Out, a
gay and lesbian online service in San
Francisco; and the Internet Content
Coalition, which represents 23 Web
publishers including CNet in San
Francisco.
Copyright C 1999 The Chronicle
Publishing Co.
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SETBACK FOR A LAW SHIELDING MINORS FROM ADULT WEB
SITES
The New York Times
Tuesday, February 2, 1999
Pamela Mendels
A Federal judge yesterday blocked a
new law that supporters said would shield
children from pornography on the World
Wide Web but that opponents said would
chill free speech on line.
In issuing the preliminary injunction,
Judge Lowell A. Reed Jr. of District Court
in Philadelphia wrote that many of those
who had brought the lawsuit to stop the
law, the Child Online Protection Act, had
said their fears of prosecution under the
law would result in self-censorship and
that he had concluded "such fears are
reasonable given the breadth of the
statute."
"Such a chilling effect," he continued,
"could result in the censoring of
constitutionally protected speech, which
constitutes an irreparable harm to the
plaintiffs."
Judge Reed cited the "personal regret"
that his decision would "delay once again
the careful protection of our children."
But, he added, "perhaps we do the minors
of this country harm if the First
Amendment protections, which they will
with age inherit fully, are chipped away in
the name of their protection."
The law, which was signed by
President Clinton last October, has never
gone into effect because Judge Reed
blocked it last fall under a temporary
restraining order that was to expire at
midnight yesterday.
Ann Beeson, a lawyer for the
American Civil Liberties Union, which led
a coalition of businesses and groups
opposed to the law, said she was "thrilled"
by the decision. "Yet again, a Federal
judge has recognized that Congress must
be careful-and it has not been careful-
when it passes laws that burden speech on
the Internet," she said.
A spokeswoman for the Department
of Justice, which defended the law, had no
comment beyond saying that Government
lawyers were reviewing the decision,
though Ms. Beeson said the Government
had several options, among them
appealing the preliminary injunction.
Bruce A. Taylor, a lawyer for the
National Law Center for Children and
Families, which filed court papers on
behalf of legislators who sponsored the
law, said he was disappointed by the
ruling. The legislators intended the act "to
regulate porn sites to stop giving their
teasers to our kids," Mr. Taylor said,
referring to free samples that some
pornographic Web sites offered visitors.
"We think the judge was in error."
Plaintiffs, meanwhile, were jubilant.
"We can operate business as usual," said
Mitchell S. Tepper, who operates the
Sexual Health Network, a small Web site
with information on sex for the disabled.
Mr. Tepper had testified in court that he
feared the candid nature of his site could
put it in jeopardy if the new law stayed on
the books.
The law would make it illegal for the
operator of a commercial Web site to
459
make sexually explicit material deemed
harmful to minors available to those
under 17. A site that carried such material,
but that gated it off from children through
credit cards or other mechanisms to verify
the age of the user, would have an
acceptable defense under the act.
Violators face fines of up to $50,000 per
offense and six months in jail.
The measure was introduced in
Congress last year after an earlier effort to
regulate children's access to pornography
on line, the Communications Decency
Act, was found to be unconstitutionally
broad in a 1997 decision by the United
States Supreme Court. That law was wider
in scope than the Child Online Protection
Act. It banned not only material harmful
to minors, which, among other things,
must lack scientific, literary, artistic or
political value for those under 17, but
"indecent" material in general.
Backers of the new law say it is aimed
primarily at teaser ads, free samples
offered by Web pornography sites that sell
most of their material. But opponents say
the law is so broad that it could be applied
to other kinds of Web ventures that
frequently or on occasion carry sexually
explicit content, like those dealing with
gynecological issues.
The plaintiffs included a broad variety
of Web businesses, from Condomania, a
condom retailer, to Powell's Bookstore,
the on-line version of a general-interest
bookstore chain in Portland, Ore.
Copyright C 1999 The New York Times
Company
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ENCRYPTION SOFTWARE
Matthew Frey *
Next to figuring out how to deliver Internet access to more people more quickly,
perhaps the greatest challenge facing the Internet industry is how to safeguard the
transmission of sensitive information over the Net. In an effort to meet this challenge,
however, many companies have run up against government restrictions on exports of the
most powerful encryption software. The government claims that making the software
available overseas will curtail law-enforcement efforts to break the codes that international
criminals and terrorists use.
Yet a Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decision issued this spring may put a damper on
the government's efforts. A three-judge panel ruled that the government's policies
"interdict(ed) the flow of scientific ideas" and "appear(ed) to strike deep into the heartland
of the First Amendment."
The case stems from an application a professor of computer science made to the State
Department earlier this decade. Then a graduate student at the University of California at
Berkeley, Daniel J. Bernstein requested government permission to publish the source code
of an encryption program he had developed. The State Department rejected his request
under the terms of the government's export restrictions. In its letter to Bernstein, the
government wrote that the program qualified as a "munition," and therefore was subject to
arms-trafficking laws.
Critics of the government's stance point to the unregulated market in encryption
software overseas as evidence that U.S. restrictions do little to deter international crime
organizations.
If the government chooses to appeal, export restrictions will remain in effect until the
matter is settled.
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COURT BACKS SCIENTIST ON ENCRYPTION
Export Limits Ruled Curb on Free Speech
The Washington Post
Friday, May 7,1999
Aaron Pressman, Reuters
A U.S. Appeals Court ruled yesterday
that strict export limits on computer data-
scrambling technology violated the free-
speech rights of a computer scientist who
wanted to post his encryption software
program on the Internet.
While the scope of the decision by a
three-judge panel of the 9th Circuit Court
of Appeals in Washington was limited to
the scientist, University of Illinois
professor Daniel Bernstein, other
academics and numerous high-technology
companies that oppose the export rules
are likely to seek a broader ruling.
The Department of Commerce, which
oversees the export limits, could also
appeal the decision to the full 9th Circuit
or the Supreme Court. A spokeswoman
for the agency said officials were still
reviewing the decision yesterday and
declined to comment.
In yesterday's decision, the court ruled
that a version of Bernstein's encryption
program, called Snuffle, written in a way
that humans could understand, known as
''source code," was protected by the First
Amendment's free-speech clause.
Source code must be run through
another program to create code readable
by a computer known as object code.
The court did not strike down the
rules as applied to working computer
software programs, written to actually run
on a computer.
"To the extent the government's
efforts are aimed at interdicting the flow
of scientific ideas (whether expressed in
source code or otherwise), as
distinguished from encryption products,
these efforts would appear to strike deep
into the heartland of the First
Amendment," the court said.
Bernstein's attorney, Cindy Cohn, said
the decision meant the export rules were
unconstitutional for anyone living in the
9th Circuit's territory, which includes
California. "This is precedent for them
that it is unconstitutional in the 9th
Circuit," Cohn said.
The case arose in 1995 after Bernstein,
then a graduate student at the University
of California, asked the State Department
for permission to put source code for
Snuffle on the Internet. The department
said the posting would violate the export
rules, so Bernstein sued.
Copyright © 1999 The Washington Post
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GOVERNMENT IS DEALT BLOW ON ENCRYPTION CODE
RESTRAINTS
U.S. Appeals Panel Says Federal Export Restrictions on Data-
Scramblng are Unconstitutional
Los Angeles Times
Friday, May 7,1999
Greg Miller, Times Staff Writer
Government efforts to block the
export of data-scrambling encryption code
are an unconstitutional restraint on free
speech, according to a ruling by a federal
appeals court in San Francisco on
Thursday.
The decision, which affirms an earlier
lower court ruling, is a significant setback
for the government in its efforts to curb
the spread of encryption technology
developed by U.S. companies.
"This is a giant step forward to
bringing down export controls," said Tara
Lemmey, president of the Electronic
Frontier Foundation, a civil liberties
group. "Encryption is critical to the
advancement of the Internet, e-commerce
and communications."
The government has up to 45 days to
appeal the ruling, perhaps to the U.S.
Supreme Court, and export restrictions
will remain in place in the meantime.
Government attorneys were not available
for comment.
But the three-judge panel on the U.S.
9th Circuit Court of Appeals chastised the
government for "interdicting the flow of
scientific ideas," and said such efforts
"appear to strike deep into the heartland
of the 1st Amendment."
Encryption software is widely used on
the Internet to scramble everything from
e-mail to financial transactions, rendering
sensitive communications unreadable to
all but intended recipients.
The federal government has restricted
the export of the most powerful
encryption software on the grounds that it
weakens the ability of law enforcement
agencies to intercept and decode the
communications of international crime
rings and terrorists.
Thursday's ruling arose from a case
involving an encryption program created
by a University of Illinois professor while
he was a UC Berkeley student in the early
1990s.
The professor, Daniel J. Bernstein,
sought permission to publish the source
code for his program, called "Snuffle,"
but the State Department rejected the
request, saying the program was a
"munition" subject to federal arms-
trafficking regulations.
Backed by privacy advocates and civil
liberties groups, Bernstein filed a suit
arguing that the government's restriction
was unconstitutional. That view was first
affirmed by a U.S. District Court in
Northern California, and upheld on
Thursday by the appellate panel.
The panel noted that Bernstein wished
to publish his program in "source code"
format, meaning as text that can be read
by humans. Programmers share ideas by
exchanging source code the "way that
mathematicians use equations," a means
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of sharing ideas that deserves 1st
Amendment protection.
The 9th Circuit encompasses nine
Western states, including California.
Privacy advocates and software
industry executives in the U.S. have
chafed under the restrictions, arguing that
it keeps them out of a growing
international market for security software.
They also point out that criminals and
terrorists are free to use powerful
encryption programs developed overseas.
In its comments, the appellate panel
made an argument for relaxing export
controls and encouraging the
development of encryption technology.
"The availability and use of secure
encryption may offer an opportunity to
reclaim some portion of the privacy we
have lost," the court said.
Copyright ( 1999 Times Mirror Company
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THE CLEAN AIR ACT
Matthew Frey *
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) must decide whether to appeal a ruling
issued last May that blocked agency efforts to combat air pollution. The regulations, part of
the Clean Air Act governing the output of smog and soot, took effect in 1997.
By a 2-1 majority, however, the United States Appeals Court for the D.C. Circuit, ruled
that the EPA had "failed to state intelligibly" how much pollution was too much. As a
result, the court concluded that the agency had assumed "an unconstitutional delegation of
legislative power."
Advocates for the regulations including the White House were dismayed by the court's
ruling. "We will continue to do everything in our power to ensure that the American people
are adequately protected against . .. harmful air pollutants," said presidential spokesman Joe
Lockhart.
The U.S. Chamber of Commerce, one of the organizations that challenged the EPA's
regulations, however, was jubilant. "It's a big victory, one of the biggest," said Robin
Conrad, the Chamber's senior vice president for litigation. Conrad likened the method the
EPA used to set the standards to "picking numbers out of the hat."
If the EPA does not appeal the D.C. Circuit's decision, it will have to begin to draft new
regulations in line with the court's ruling, a process that could take years.
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CLEAN AIR RULE HITS ROADBLOCK
Appeals Court Decision May Bring Revisions in Smog, Soot Standards
The Houston Chronicle
Saturday, May 15, 1999
Bill Dawson, Houston Chronicle Environment Writer
A cloud of uncertainty enveloped
planning efforts to improve air quality in
Houston and other cities as a result of a
federal appeals court's ruling on Friday.
The divided ruling by the three-judge
panel threw into doubt the U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency's ability
to enforce the stricter air quality standards
it adopted in 1997 for ground-level ozone
("smog") and airborne particles ("soot").
Clinton administration officials had
said the stricter standards were essential to
protect children, the elderly and other
sensitive individuals from various health
problems related to air pollution.
By a 2-1 vote, the Court of Appeals in
Washington, D.C., said the interpretation
of one section of the federal Clean Air
Act that the EPA used in adopting the
standards represented "an
unconstitutional delegation of legislative
power.
The case was returned to the EPA to
develop a "constitutional" interpretation
of the act-a process that the majority
ruling said could produce modifications in
the disputed ozone and particle standards.
The American Trucking Associations
led an array of industry groups in waging
the legal effort that led to the ruling,
which one major business organization
quickly praised.
"It's a big victory. One of the
biggest," said Robin Conrad, senior vice
president for litigation at the U.S.
Chamber of Commerce.
The EPA now will have to start the
process of setting the new ozone and
particle standards over again "and justify
its numbers," she said.
Business and industry groups,
including the Greater Houston
Partnership, had argued that the standards
were not sufficiently backed by scientific
evidence.
But President Clinton's press
secretary, Joe Lockhart, said
administration officials were "deeply
disappointed" by the ruling, "particularly
given the court's explicit recognition that
there is a strong scientific and public
health rationale for tougher air quality
protections."
He said administration officials "will
continue to do everything within our
power to ensure that the American people
are adequately protected against smog,
soot, and other harmful air pollutants."
The EPA released a statement saying
it would recommend that the Justice
Department appeal the ruling.
The complex ruling created a number
of immediate questions about its relevance
in different cities, because it involved an
older and newer ozone standard (both of
which are legally in force) and two
interrelated standards for airborne
particles tiny ones known as "coarse"
and even smaller ones known as "fine."
Houston has long violated the older
ozone standard - which sets a legal limit
for one-hour concentrations of the
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respiratory irritant - and local and state
planners are busy assessing new measures
that might be adopted to meet that
standard by 2007, as the Clean Air Act
orders.
Regardless of what the appeals court
ruling may do to the new and stricter
standard - which sets an eight-hour
average limit for ozone exposures - state
officials believe planning efforts to meet
the older standard in Houston will remain
on track, said Patrick Crimmins,
spokesman for the Texas Natural
Resource Conservation Commission.
Beyond that, however, TNRCC
attorneys were analyzing the ruling but
"really unsure of its implications for Texas
now," Crimmins said.
Along with Houston, Dallas-Fort
Worth, Beaumont-Port Arthur and El
Paso also violate the older ozone
standard, while five other urban areas in
the state are believed to be at risk of
violating the newer standard.
The TNRCC had planned to report to
Gov. George W. Bush in July on whether
it appears that those areas - Austin, San
Antonio, Corpus Christi and Victoria,
Longview-Tyler-Marshall - will be in
violation of that standard at the end of
this year and therefore subject to required
pollution-reduction measures.
The uncertainties created by the
appeals court's ruling are exemplified by
the TNRCC's pending proposal to require
the sale of cleaner-burning gasoline across
the eastern half of the state. (A different,
lower-emission blend is already required
in the Houston and Dallas areas.)
The state commission is to decide
later this month on whether to adopt the
new gasoline rule, which largely was
intended to help cities in the eastern part
of the state avoid violation of the newer
ozone standard.
The ruling also raised questions about
Houston Mayor Lee Brown's call last
week for measures to substantially reduce
airborne particles in the Houston area,
even before the EPA rules that Houston
violates the new particle standard and
such action is federally required here.
Brown's proposal was based on a city-
sponsored study by California researchers,
who concluded that airborne particles are
responsible for annual health impacts in
this area, including an estimated 435
"premature" deaths and 1,196 new cases
of chronic bronchitis.
Copyright C 1999 The Houston Chronicle
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COURT BLOCKS NEW EPA RULES
Ozone, Particulate Levels at Issue
The Arizona Republic
Saturday, May 15, 1999
Mary jo Pitzl
A U.S. Appeals Court on Friday
blocked tighter standards for ozone and
particulate pollution that earned praise -
and raised a furor - in Arizona when
announced in 1997.
The court ruled that the federal
Environmental Protection Agency had
arbitrarily set standards for permissible
levels of pollution and that it would have
been unconstitutional for Congress to
have granted it such broad authority under
the Clean Air Act.
The action of a three-judge panel of
the U.S. Court of Appeals in Washington
puts on hold standards that were to be
phased in over the next decade by the
EPA.
The standards would have applied
nationally for ozone, or smog, and
nucroscopic bits of particulate matter. For
the first time, the new rules were designed
to regulate the tiniest particles spewed by
industrial smokestacks and autos.
Proponents had welcomed the EPA
measures, saying that Phoenix and other
Western cities would be among the places
that would benefit the most. The stricter
standards would have especially helped
children and the elderly who suffer from
health problems related to air pollution,
the advocates said.
But critics said the changes could have
cost Maricopa County businesses up to
$184 million in federal non-compliance
standards over the next 10 years.
On Friday, local air-quality officials
said they couldn't immediately determine
the effect of the court's ruling on
metropolitan Phoenix.
The state Department of
Environmental Quality declined to
comment, saying it will take some time to
analyze the opinion.
The fact that the EPA likely will
appeal the decision also makes the DEQ
hesitant to comment immediately, said
agency spokeswoman Kern Waggener.
However, the pollution-plagued Valley
of the Sun faced bleak prospects with the
EPA's 1997 standards for ozone.
Air quality analyses over the past two
years have repeatedly shown that, if
required to meet the new health standard
for ozone measured over eight hours, the
Valley would fail. That would tighten the
limit on how many ozone-forming
chemicals local businesses could emit.
The Valley is having trouble meeting
the EPA's existing ozone standard. If it
could meet the existing standard by
summer's end, it would have faced the
EPA's new standards, effective in 2006.
The EPA regulations for tiny bits of
particulate matter, called PM 2.5, would
have taken effect in 2003.
However, the U.S. Court of Appeals
in Washington, D.C., ruled that the EPA
crossed constitutional lines in drawing up
the new pollution rules, calling the
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agency's action "an unconstitutional
delegation of legislative power."
The court, in a 2-1 ruling, said the
EPA didn't clearly define the point at
which ozone and particulate-matter levels
become threats.
"It has failed to state intelligibly how
much is too much," the judges wrote.
The court sent the rules back to EPA
to be redrawn in a method that does not
trample on Congress' role to set law.
The EPA said it will ask the Justice
Department to appeal, and called on
Congress to keep public health
protections mitact.
"The soot and smog standards put in
place almost two years ago will protect the
health of 125 million Americans, including
35 million children" who breathe polluted
air, the agency said.
The White House said it was "deeply
disappointed" by the ruling, especially
since the court acknowledged that science
and public health concerns justified the
tighter air pollution rules.
"We will continue to do everything in
our power to ensure that the American
people are adequately protected against.
. harmful air pollutants," White House
spokesman Joe Lockhart said.
A variety of industry sources sued the
EPA after the new rules were announced
in 1997. Among the plaintiffs were the
American Trucking Association Inc. and
the U.S. Chamber of Commerce.
"It's a big victory, one of the biggest,"
said Robin Conrad, senior vice president
for litigation at the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce. She said the ruling
acknowledged industry claims that the
EPA was "picking numbers out of the
hat" when it set the standards.
The EPA will have to "start the
process all over again ... and justify its
numbers," she said.
That might be good news, said Dave
Feuerherd, program manager for the
American Lung Association of Arizona.
The court appears to have problems
with the process of drawing up the new
pollution rules, not the scientific need for
tighter health standards, he said.
If that's the case, a rewrite of the rules
could allow health groups to argue for
even tighter standards, especially those for
ozone, he said.
The Appeals Court rejected industry
claims that the new rules were based on
bad science- and it said the agency was
right in not considering costs when
deciding how much air pollution is
unhealthful.
Randy Wittorp, a spokesman for the
EPA division that oversees Arizona, said
the court ruling will have no effect on
ongoing clean-air efforts, such as the push
for cleaner fuels or vehicle-emissions
programs.
Copyright C 1999 Phoenix Newspapers,
Inc.
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THE FOURTH CIRCUIT CONFESSES
Miranda Warning Not Necessary
Matthew Frey *
Revisiting one of the Supreme Court's most famous reforms of criminal procedure, a 2-1
majority of the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals declared last February that Congress in 1968
effectively gutted the Court's ruling in Miranda v. Ari <ona, the case that introduced "You
have the right to remain silent. . ." into every policeman's vocabulary.
The Miranda Court justified its 1966 on the grounds that it would protect against coerced
confessions. The Fourth Circuit, however, said that a law curtailing Miranda that Congress
passed in 1968 but seven consecutive presidential administrations have chosen not to
enforce was a legitimate alteration of the law governing confessions. The 1968 law states
that voluntary confessions can be admitted in federal court even if a Miranda warning was
not given before the confession took place.
The controversy turns on whether the Supreme Court's ruling in Miranda was
constitutional, one that Congressional legislation cannot alter, or whether Congress was
indeed free to pass legislation overriding the Court's decision.
Commentators seem to agree that, if the Fourth Circuit's decision is appealed, the
Supreme Court will be reluctant to overturn Miranda.
"If this goes to the Supreme Court, the justices will have to decide whether they want to
toss out more than 30 years of jurisprudence that's stemmed from Miranda," noted Stephen
Saltzburg, a law professor at George Washington University. "I don't think they'll go for
that."
"It would be an interesting battle," said University of Michigan law professor Yale
Kamisar, "but I think Miranda would win out."
An appeal to the Supreme Court could follow the full Fourth Circuit's review of the
three-judge panel's decision.
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ADMINISTRATION DEFENDS MIRANDA DECISION
Justice Department Argues That Congress has No Power to Overturn
Ruling
The Baltimore Sun
Tuesday, March 9, 1999
Lyle Denniston, Sun National Staff
WASHINGTON - The Clinton
administration came to the defense
yesterday of the Supreme Court's
controversial 1966 Miranda decision,
arguing that Congress had no power to
tell courts to accept confessions by
criminals who had not been given
"Miranda warnings" about their rights.
In a case that appears headed for the
Supreme Court, the Justice Department
asked the full 4th U.S. Circuit Court of
Appeals in Richmond, Va., to reconsider
and scuttle a ruling last month by three of
its members. That decision said that under
a 1968 law passed by Congress, voluntary
confessions can be admitted in federal
cases even if a Miranda warning was not
given.
On the contrary, the department said,
the ruling in Miranda vs. Arizona
"implements and protects constitutional
rights," and thus can be overridden only
by the Supreme Court or by a
constitutional amendment, not by
Congress or by lower courts.
Under the 1966 Miranda decision,
police are required to tell any suspects
they are holding-before any
questioning-of the right to remain silent
and the right to have a lawyer present, and
to warn them that anything they say can
be used against them in court. The
warnings are designed to prevent coerced
confessions.
The decision by the three-judge panel
"raises an issue of exceptional
importance" justifying full appeals court
review, the department argued.
By a 2-1 vote, the three-judge panel
ruled that Miranda is not a constitutional
ruling, so Congress was free to displace it,
as it did, with a federal law that said a
confession that was voluntary is to be
admitted in federal court even if the
suspect did not get Miranda warnings.
The Justice Department said that
while Congress passed the 1968
confessions law "with the express purpose
of overturning Miranda," the lawmakers
had "no power to alter the substance of
the Supreme Court's constitutional
interpretations by legislation."
"Miranda has never been overruled,
and it is the Supreme Court's sole
province to pass on the continuing validity
of its decisions."
Examining all of the court's rulings on
Miranda warnings, from 1966 onward, the
department said, "requires the conclusion
that the court understands Miranda to rest
on a constitutional foundation."
The clearest evidence of that, it added,
is that "the Supreme Court has
consistently applied Miranda to the
states"-something that it could not do if
the ruling were not based upon the
Constitution.
"Although the court has the power to
announce rules of procedure and evidence
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binding on federal courts," it has not done
so for state courts, because its authority in
that realm "is limited to enforcing the
commands of the U.S. Constitution," it
added.
The department took its position in
the case of a Maryland man, Charles T.
Dickerson, formerly of Takoma Park,
who faces charges stemming from at least
seven bank robberies in Maryland and
three in Virginia.
The key to the dispute in his case is a
confession that he gave to police before
getting Miranda warnings. The appeals
court panel ruled that, despite the lack of
warnings, the confession was given
voluntarily, and thus can be used against
Dickerson when he goes to trial.
Dickerson has asked the full appeals
court to review the case, and the Justice
Department's filing adds its support to
that request.
Copyright C 1999 The Baltimore Sun
Company
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LEGAL EXPERTS EXPECT MIRANDA TO BE UPHELD
An Appeals Court Ruling Could Spur Justices to Restudy the Landmark
Case
Dayton Daily News
Friday, February 12,1999
Richard Careli, Associated Press
WASHINGTON - Americans,
having witnessed untold numbers of
arrests in movies and on TV, know the
drill: "You have the right to remain silent.
Anything you say may be used against you
in a court of law. You have the right to an
attorney. If you cannot afford one, an
attorney will be appointed for you."
Now the Supreme Court's 1966
Miranda decision requiring police
nationwide to give such warnings before
questioning criminal suspects is under
attack. A federal appeals court ruling
could spur the justices to restudy the
landmark case that has made numerous
confessions or incriminating remarks to
police inadmissible as evidence when
offered by people who had not been read
their rights.
Legal experts doubt the Supreme
Court will let state and local police ignore
its decision called Miranda vs. Arizona. "If
this goes to the Supreme Court, the
justices will have to decide whether they
want to toss out more than 30 years of
jurisprudence that's stemmed from
Miranda," said Stephen Saltzburg, a
George Washington University law
professor. "I don't think they'll go for
that."
University of Michigan law professor
Yale Kamisar said, "It would be an
interesting battle, but I think Miranda
would win out."
The Miranda decision was steeped in
the constitutional protection against
self-incrimination, but the Supreme Court
never explicitly said the Constitution
requires such warnings to guard against
police coercion.
Ruling in a Virginia bank robbery case
this week, a three-judge panel of the 4th
U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals said a
long-ignored 1968 federal law trumped
the Miranda decision and freed federal law
enforcement officers from having to give
the familiar warnings in every case.
That ruling is now binding law in the
4th Circuit's five states - Virginia,
Maryland, North Carolina, South Carolina
and West Virginia.
Congress said in the 1968 law that
evidence obtained without the warning
being given could be used at trial as long
as federal judges are sure the statements
were made voluntarily. The law says
compliance with Miranda is just one
factor to be considered.
Seven presidential administrations
have refused to enforce that law, however,
out of concern for its constitutionality.
"We ... have determined the Supreme
Court has concluded that (Miranda) is
constitutionally based since ... it has
applied it to the states as well," Attorney
General Janet Reno said Thursday. "It
would be up to the Supreme Court to
make the determination that it was not
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constitutionally based."
The nation's highest court is far more
conservative than it was 33 years ago, and
several of its members repeatedly have
played down the Miranda decision's
constitutional dimensions even as the
court rebuffed numerous attempts
through the 1970s and 1980s to overturn
it.
"There's no groundswell to get rid of
Miranda," Kamisar said.
The Virginia case likely will be
referred to the full 4th Circuit court, and
then to the Supreme Court.
Copyright C 1999 Dayton Daily News
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CONFESSIONS ISSUE SPLITS COURT
4 mH Circuit Says Law Supersedes Miranda
Richmond Times-Dispatch
Tuesday, February 9, 1999
Tom Campbell, Times-Dispatch Staff Writer
The U.S. Court of Appeals in
Richmond ruled 2-1 yesterday that a
long-unused 1968 federal law on
voluntary confessions supersedes the U.S.
Supreme Court's 1966 Miranda decision
and must govern the admissibility of
confessions in federal courts.
A split three-judge panel of the
appeals court for the 4th Circuit made
that ruling in reversing a U.S. District
Court judge in Alexandria who suppressed
a bank robbery defendant's voluntary
confession. The case was argued more
than a year ago.
The published opinion is binding only
in federal court cases in the five states of
the 4th Circuit - Virginia, West Virginia,
Maryland, North Carolina and South
Carolina.
U.S. District Judge James C. Cacheris
of Alexandria found that defendant
Charles Thomas Dickerson's confession,
made Jan. 27, 1997, to FBI agents who
were questioning him, was voluntary. But
the judge suppressed it as evidence
because it was made before Dickerson
waived his rights under Miranda, the U.S.
Supreme Court decision protecting a
suspect's right to counsel and to remain
silent.
Appeals court Judge Karen J. Williams
wrote the 60-page opinion and U.S.
District Judge Jackson L. Kiser, sitting on
the appeals court as a substitute, joined
with her to reverse the lower court.
The third panel member, Judge M.
Blane Michael, disagreed with them on the
confession issue and called it a mistake to
consider the 1968 law, Section 3501 of the
U.S. Criminal Code, because it was not
raised on appeal by government
prosecutors.
The issue of Section 3501 was brought
up on appeal not by parties in the case,
but by the Washington Legal Foundation
and the Safe Streets Coalition, which
entered as friends-of-the-court.
Law professor Paul George Cassell at
the University of Utah, who helped argue
the case on behalf of the two groups, said
last night that the ruling restores
"voluntariness" as the standard for
admissible confessions. He also said the
issue is likely to go to the U.S. Supreme
Court.
In 1966, Miranda established
protection of a defendant's Fifth
Amendment right to avoid
self-incrimination through the required
use of warnings and waivers when
authorities question a suspect. But, Cassell
said, Miranda is a set of rules for
protecting constitutional guarantees, and
not part of the Constitution or on the
same level.
Judge Michael's dissent said whether
Miranda is "a constitutional rule" is still at
issue.
Congress enacted Section 3501 in
1968, two years after Miranda, making it
clear that in federal criminal prosecutions,
"a confession ... shall be admissible in
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evidence if it is voluntarily given."
Cassell said the 4th Circuit panel
ruling says that, with Section 3501,
Congress properly changed-but did not
overturn-the rules set by the Supreme
Court in the Miranda decision.
In her opinion, Williams scolded the
U.S. Department of Justice for not
invoking and defending Section 3501,
which no administration has done since
1968 and which U.S. Attorney General
Janet Reno in 1997 refused to do in a
letter to Congress. Reno said the section is
unconstitutional.
Section 3501 was invoked by
assistants of Helen F. Fahey, U.S. attorney
for the Eastern District of Virginia, in a
motion before the trial court. However,
the U.S. Department of Justice prohibited
Fahey from raising it as an issue on
appeal.
Cassell said there has been no
definitive case on the issue of Section
3501 for about 20 years. Police follow
Miranda rules most of the time and no
case with a clear Miranda violation and a
clearly voluntary confession has been
decided by a federal appeals court until
now.
In this case, because Dickerson's
voluntary confession was obtained in clear
violation of Miranda, "we cannot avoid
deciding the constitutional question
associated with Section 3501," Williams
wrote.
In his dissenting opinion, Judge
Michael complained that Williams and
Kiser went too far.
Michael wrote that 30 years have
passed since Congress enacted Section
3501 "in reaction to Miranda." President
Clinton's is the seventh consecutive
administration to decide not to use it in
criminal prosecutions.
Now, Williams and Kiser say Section
3501 "must be invoked" and also have
decided that it is constitutional, Michael
wrote.
"In pressing Section 3501 into the
prosecution of a case against the express
wishes of the Department of Justice, the
majority takes on more than any court
should."
Copyright C 1999 The Richmond Times-
Dispatch
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THE SECOND AMENDMENT ALIVE AND WELL IN TEXAS
Matthew Frey *
A federal district court decision last March that struck down a Texas law barring persons
under a restraining order from owning a gun may lead to the Supreme Court's first ruling on
the Second Amendment in over 60 years.
In the decision, Judge Sam Cummings ruled that Timothy Joe Emerson, a doctor
arrested and charged with being in possession of a handgun while under a restraining order
requested by his estranged wife, had an inalienable right under the Second Amendment to
own the gun. Judge Cummings held that the Texas law was an unconstitutional
infringement of that right.
At issue is the familiar question of whether the Second Amendment grants an individual
or a collective right to own a gun. Does "militia" refer to private citizens? Or does it refer
to what today is known as the National Guard?
The Supreme Court's last word on the controversy came in 1939 in U.S. v. Miller, in
which it ruled that a man caught transporting a sawed-off shotgun across state lines could
not claim Second Amendment protection because the weapon was "not any part of the
ordinary military equipment (n)or (could) its use ... contribute to the common defense."
Judge Cummings referred to Miller in his decision. "Ironically, one can read Miller as
supporting some of the most extreme anti-gun control arguments," he wrote. "For example,
that the individual has a right to keep and bear bazookas, rocket launchers and other
armaments that are clearly used for modem warfare, including, of course, assault weapons."
Judge Cummings also championed the Second Amendment as an integral part of the Bill of
Rights. "The rights of the Second Amendment should be as zealously guarded as the other
individual liberties enshrined in the Bill of Rights," he wrote.
Advocates on both sides of the gun control debate read great potential into Judge
Cummings' ruling.
"This has monumental potential," said Jerry Patterson, the former Texas state senator
who introduced the law allowing Texans to carry concealed weapons.
Stephen Holbrook, the lawyer who successfully challenged provisions of the Brady Bill
before the Court in 1997's PrintP v. United States, agreed. "If appealed, this could be the
springboard for a definitive Supreme Court ruling on the Second Amendment," he said.
Brian Morton, a spokesman for the Center to Prevent Violence in Washington,
conveyed a sense of the urgency underlying the issue.
"With all respect to the judge, this goes almost totally contrary to all decision on the
matter," he said. "This is a case screaming for appeal."
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
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STICK TO YOUR GUNS
2nd Amendment Issue Heading to High Court
The Denver Post
Sunday, July 11, 1999
Jules Witcover
Ever since the Columbine High
School shooting put the debate about
guns on the front burner of American
discourse, the advocates of a guaranteed
individual right to own firearms, led by
the National Rifle Association, have been
put on the defensive.
NRA spokesmen declare the Second
Amendment's stipulation that "the right
of the people to keep and bear arms shall
not be infringed" is not merely a collective
right, despite numerous lower court
rulings and one 60 years ago by the
Supreme Court to the contrary.
These rulings have taken note of the
conditional phrase in the Second
Amendment that prefaces the declared
right: "A well-regulated militia, being
necessary to the security of a free state...
." The courts have often said the
Constitution intended that the right to
bear arms be tied to collective defense of
the state, as in a militia in Colonial times
and its closest modem-day 'counterpart,
the National Guard.
Most often cited by gun-control
activists is the Supreme Court's 1939
ruling in U.S. vs. Miller. It found that a
man charged with transporting a sawed-
off shotgun across state lines in violation
of the National Firearms Act of 1934
could not claim an individual right of
ownership, because the weapon was not
proved to have "some reasonable
relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well-regulated militia."
The court noted that the weapon was
"not any part of the ordinary military
equipment or that its use could contribute
to the common defense."
Interpretation too narrow
But the NRA and the rest of the gun
lobby argue that this ruling and others like
it were too narrow in their interpretations
of the Second Amendment. In a largely
effective public-relations campaign, the
gun lobbyists have managed to inculcate
as fact their contention that the
Constitution guarantees an individual right
to keep and bear arms.
Until recently, the success of this
effort has been based more on relentless
repetition than legal precedent. But a case
that could bring the issue to a head might
be the one from a U.S. District Court in
northern Texas. There, Judge Sam R.
Cummings has held that the Second
Amendment did indeed bestow an
individual gun-bearing right on law-
abiding American citizens. (Convicted
felons lose that right, a condition that the
gun lobby does not challenge.)
A family physician, Timothy Joe
Emerson, under a Texas lower court's
temporary restraining order in a divorce
proceeding, was ordered not to make
"threatening communications or actual
attacks" on his wife, Sacha. She alleged,
according to court papers, that he
"threatened over the telephone to kill the
man with whom Mrs. Emerson had been
having an adulterous affair."
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Emerson happened to have a gun in
his possession, in violation of the
restraining order. The court papers noted,
however, that no evidence was presented
to show Emerson had threatened
violence. The papers also noted the court
had not admonished Emerson that the
restraining order would make him subject
to federal criminal prosecution "merely
for possessing a firearm while being
subject to the order."
Cummings, in explaining his decision,
took note of the argument between gun
advocates and foes about whether the
Second Amendment guarantees an
individual or a collective right to keep and
bear arms.
Siding with the NRA, he ruled that the
function of the clause relating to a "well-
regulated militia" was "not to qualify the
right, but instead to show why it must be
protected." He cited precedents in English
law and colonial statutes, observing that
without the individual right to bear arms,
"the colonists never could have won the
Revolutionary War."
Aligned with other rights
Drawing on James Madison's
Federalist No. 46 and other documents,
the judge observed that Madison had
"aligned the right to bear arms along with
the other individual rights of freedom of
religion and the press, rather than with
congressional power to regulate the
militia."
Of the Supreme Court decision in the
Miller case, Cummings said, "Ironically,
one can read Miller as supporting some of
the most extreme anti-gun control
arguments; for example, that the
individual has a right to keep and bear
bazookas, rocket launchers and other
armaments that are clearly used for
modem warfare, including, of course,
assault weapons."
As for the argument of gun-control
advocates that the Second Amendment's
reference to a well-regulated militia
reflected societal conditions of a bygone
day that had not yet seen the firearms that
have become a public scourge, the
Cummings decision said, "Concerns about
the social costs of enforcing the Second
Amendment must be outweighed by
considering the lengths to which the
federal courts have gone to uphold other
rights (such as freedom of speech, press
and religion) in the Constitution. The
rights of the Second Amendment should
be as zealously guarded as the other
individual liberties enshrined in the Bill of
Rights."
The Miller case, Cummings said, "did
not answer the crucial question of
whether the Second Amendment
embodies an individual or collective right
to bear arms. The court in Miller simply
chose a very narrow way to rule on the
issue and left for another day further
questions of Second Amendment
construction."
For the NRA and its allies, the
decision in the Texas case could be a life
preserver in the sea of troubles that has
swept over them in the wake of the
Colorado school shootings. Until now,
they have relied on other constitutional
protections to fight the gun-control
forces, rather than-their critics say-
risking a Supreme Court test on the
meaning and scope of the Second
Amendment.
For example, in their battle against the
Brady Law imposing a waiting period on
gun purchases, they argued in Printz vs.
U.S. that the 10th Amendment, which
says powers not delegated to the federal
government are reserved to the states,
meant that the 50 states could not be
ordered to enforce the background checks
at their expense. In direct conflict
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The Cummings decision is expected
to be appealed to the 5th Circuit Court
this summer, and gun-control activists
insist it will be reversed because it is in
direct conflict with federal district court
rulings that the Second Amendment
conveys a collective, not an individual,
right to keep and bear arms. Therefore,
one would expect that they would
welcome a higher court review and be
doing all they could to bring one about.
But, surprisingly, that is not
happening. Dennis Hennigan, legal
director of the Center to Prevent
Handgun Violence, says his side will not
be pushing for the Emerson case to go to
the Supreme Court, because the legal
situation as it stands-with all the
favorable lower-court decisions, as well as
the Miller case-"couldn't be better for
us, (so) why take the risk?"
Even if the Supreme Court were to
rule that gun ownership is not an
individual right, Hennigan says, at least
two conservative justices could be
counted on to dissent-Antonin Scalia
and Clarence Thomas-and the NRA
would insist the dissenting opinions were
correct. However, he says, if the
Cummings decision is upheld on appeal in
Texas, "the whole landscape changes,"
and the gun-control forces could not
stand by idly.
In any event, he acknowledges, the
current public revulsion toward the gun
epidemic does offer a favorable climate
for a Supreme Court showdown on the
intent and reach of the Second
Amendment. "The Court is not supposed
to be influenced by public opinion,"
Hennigan says, but its members are not
totally insulated from it, either.
One might think that if both sides are
convinced of the rightness of their
arguments, they would welcome a
definitive ruling from the highest court,
once and for all. There is a risk, to be sure,
in such a finding. A declaration that gun-
bearing is an individual right would open
the door to even more gun ownership. A
ruling that it is a collective right would
undercut the very premise on which the
NRA operates.
Still, such a critical issue should not be
left so clouded in dispute, more than 200
years after the amendment's ratification.
Jules Witcover is an author and syndicated
columnist. This article originally appeared
in the Baltimore Sun.
Copyright C 1999 The Denver Post
Corporation
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US JUDGE HITS AT GUN CONTROL
2nd Amendment Cited in Texas Case
The Boston Globe
April 4, 1999
Chis Newton, Associated Press
LUBBOCK, Texas - A federal judge's
ruling last week involving an unusual
Texas law could be the basis for far-
reaching challenges to other gun-control
laws, legal specialists said.
In the case, US District Judge Sam
Cummings dismissed charges against a
man accused of breaking a law that bars
someone under a restraining order from
owning a gun.
"If appealed, this could be the
springboard for a definitive Supreme
Court ruling on the Second Amendment,"
said Stephen Holbrook, a lawyer who
represented sheriffs in a successful
challenge to provisions of the federal
Brady gun-control law. "That could have
wide implications."
The case revolves around Timothy Joe
Emerson, a doctor in San Angelo who
was arrested last year and charged with
violating a restraining order after
brandishing a handgun in front of his wife
and her daughter.
Defense attorneys argued that
Emerson has a right to own guns under
the Second Amendment to the
Constitution, and that any law infringing
upon that is unconstitutional.
Cummings agreed, ruling on Thursday
that the night to bear arms described in
the Second Amendment is a protected
individual right and not just a right
belonging to an organized militia, as
federal prosecutors contended.
Government lawyers planned to
appeal.
Activists on both sides of the issue
agreed that the decision could be the first
in which a judge specifically called a law
unconstitutional because it infringed on
an individual's Second Amendment rights.
"This has monumental potential," said
former state senator Jerry Patterson, who
authored the law that allows Texans to
carry concealed handguns.
Gun-control advocates, however,
assailed the case as an anomaly that will
probably be overturned.
"No gun-control law has ever been
struck down because of the Second
Amendment," said Brian Morton, a
spokesman for the Center to Prevent
Violence in Washington.
"With all respect to the judge, this
goes almost totally contrary to all
decisions on the matter," Morton said.
"This is a case that is screaming for
appeal."
Copyright © 1999 Globe Newspaper
Company
481
SANS SEAT BELT, SOCCER MOM SEIZED
May Police Use Custodial Arrests to Enforce Minor Traffic Violations?
Matthew Frey *
A Texas case involving a woman who was jailed for driving without her seat belt
fastened may eventually provide the Supreme Court with an opportunity to clarify the
circumstances under which police may engage in custodial arrests of people who commit
minor violations of the law. In 1997, the Court took up a similar case, Rici v. Village of
Arlington Heights, but dismissed it before hearing oral arguments.
The plaintiff in the Texas case, Gail Atwater, alleges that her Fourth Amendment
protections against unreasonable search and seizure were violated when she was thrown in
jail for violating Texas' seat belt law. A first-time offender, Atwater contends that jailing her
was out of all proportion to her crime, and that authorities just as easily could have enforced
the seat belt provision by requiring her to sign a citation swearing to appear in court.
(Ordinarily, the law carries a penalty of between $25 and $50.)
The defendant, Lago Vista, Texas, Atwater's hometown, contends that the seat belt law
grants officers broad discretionary power to enforce the measure, up to and including
placing first-time offenders like Atwater under arrest.
According to court records, Atwater was stopped by Lago Vista Police Officer Bart
Turek while driving her three young children home from their soccer practice in March
1997. At the time, Atwater was traveling 15 miles per hour through her own neighborhood.
Atwater claims that Turek mistakenly believed that Atwater had violated the law previously
and that Turek treated her harshly as a result, frightening her and her children. Atwater
further claims that Turek refused to allow her to drive the few short blocks to her house so
she could drop off her children before Turek took her away in handcuffs. (A neighbor of
Atwater's who happened to be passing by during the incident guided the children home.)
Lago Vista defeated Atwater's claims at the trial court level. A decision by Federal
District Court Judge Sam Sparks labeled claims such as Atwater's "the bane of the American
legal system." Last January, however, a unanimous three-judge panel in United States Court
of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reversed Sparks' ruling. Writing for the majority, a sardonic
Judge Robert M. Parker noted that Atwater's arrest "was not a proud moment for the City of
Lago Vista."
"We easily conclude that an arrest for a first-time seat belt offense is indeed an extreme
practice and a seizure conducted in an extraordinary manner," Judge Parker wrote. Nothing
about Atwater's crime or her conduct during Officer Turek's roadside questioning suggested
that arresting Atwater was reasonable, he concluded.
The Fifth Circuit has decided to consider the case en banc. Arguments will be heard
sometime this fall, making an appearance before the Supreme Court this term possible, but
not likely.
College of William and Mary School of Law, Class of 2001; Co-Director, Student Division
of the Institute of Bill of Rights Law.
482
JUDGE THROWS OUT 2 SUITS AGAINST LAGO VISTA POLICE
Austin American-Statesman
February 19, 1998
Dave Harmon
Stung by several citizens' lawsuits
alleging abuse of power, false
imprisonment and brutality, the Lago
Vista Police Department has found
redemption after a federal judge dismissed
two of the lawsuits, calling them meritless.
Meanwhile, the lawyer who filed the
two lawsuits -- along with four other
similar lawsuits against Lago Vista and its
police -- has been banned from practicing
in federal court and faces a possible
criminal investigation for allegedly forging
a court document in an unrelated case.
U.S. District Judge Sam Sparks last
week tossed out lawsuits filed in August
by Lago Vista residents Gail Atwater and
her family and by Shiloh Ciaccio and his
mother.
Atwater claimed an officer verbally
abused her and wrongly arrested her on
March 26, 1997, for failing to buckle in
her children while driving. Ciaccio claimed
the same officer beat him during an arrest
on April 9, 1997.
In a tersely worded ruling, Sparks said
the plaintiffs provided no evidence that
officer Bart Turek used excessive force or
violated either citizen's constitutional
rights.
"This is a lawsuit that should have
never been filed and was poorly litigated
once it was," Sparks wrote in Atwater's
case. "Suits such as this are the bane of
the American legal system."
The judge pointed out that a drunken
Ciaccio had jumped fully clothed into a
country club pool, then drove his car over
the golf course before Turek and another
officer were called and found Ciaccio
parked in his driveway.
Ciaccio, who accused the officers of
yanking him out of the car and beating
him, was struggling "vigorously" and later
had no proof he'd been injured, Sparks
ruled.
But a medical report showed Turek
had knots on his head and other injuries,
and a "disinterested witness" reported that
Ciaccio was striking the officers, Sparks
wrote. Ciaccio has been charged with
felony assault in the incident.
As for Atwater's lawsuit, which
claimed Turek verbally abused her during
a traffic stop and wrongly jailed her as her
children watched, Sparks ruled that Turek
legally arrested her for violating Texas'
seat belt law.
Atwater and Ciaccio and their lawyer,
Charles E. Lincoln, could not be reached
for comment Wednesday. Turek, now a
Williamson County deputy, did not return
a phone message.
For Lago Vista police Chief Frank
Miller, who has handpicked each of the
eight officers on his force, the rulings
brought vindication.
"It's been a very difficult time to sit
back and not defend yourself," Miller said
Wednesday. "My guys out here are not
abusive cops. In a small department, if it's
going on, I'll know it."
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Miller, who was personally named in
the lawsuits, said he and his officers found
that the majority of the community
supported the Police Department after the
lawsuits were filed.
"It was overwhelming. If anything, it
pulled this Police Department closer
together," Miller said. "Being wrongly
accused has hurt our department, hurt our
families and hurt us."
Lago Vista officials were thrilled by
Sparks' ruling. They issued a press release
with a quote from City Manager Kelvin
Knauf: "After all of the negative publicity
the city received when these cases were
initially filed, I am pleased to be able to
show that these claims are totally frivolous
and that we have a professional Police
Department."
Four other similar lawsuits against
Lago Vista police and the city are pending
before Sparks and U.S. District Judge
James R. Nowlin. But the future of those
cases seems bleak, given the way Sparks
disposed of the other two lawsuits and the
lawyer who filed them.
Last Friday, Sparks banned Lincoln
from practicing in the Western District of
Texas, the federal court district that
includes Austin. Lincoln's lawyer, John
Campbell of Austin, said his client will
appeal that decision.
The expulsion followed a hearing
before the Western District's grievance
committee and an angry letter from Judge
Nowlin, who apparently became
exasperated by some of Lincoln's legal
maneuvers and was disturbed by his
actions in a lawsuit involving a Lago Vista
family's property dispute.
According to a Sept. 8 letter Nowlin
wrote to federal court officials, Lincoln
told Marcelina and Timoteo Alvarado --
who were suing a man who sold them
property -- that they should start giving
their mortgage payments to Lincoln, who
promised to turn them over to the court
for safekeeping during the litigation.
In a written statement to Lago Vista
police, the Alvarados claimed they asked
Lincoln for receipts for the more than
$5,000 they gave him and grew suspicious
because the receipts, supposedly issued by
the court, had no date or signature.
Nowlin's letter said that Chief Miller
informed Nowlin that Lincoln cashed one
of the family's checks at a Galveston
resort.
When the family later called the court
clerk, they were told that no such account
existed and that the court never ordered
the clerk to hold any money, according to
Nowlin's letter.
When the Alvarados faxed the receipt
to the clerk, Nowlin wrote, it was
determined that the creator of the receipt'
had clipped the heading off of a civil
summons and attached it to a blank page.
"Once again, the court has been
shocked by the actions of Mr. Lincoln.
Forgery appears to be a new low," Nowlin
wrote.
In his letter, Nowlin also said he
personally contacted a federal prosecutor
about Lincoln, and the prosecutor has
contacted the FBI and the State Bar
Association and is "looking into whether
federal criminal charges are appropriate."
In court documents, Lincoln denied
the allegations, saying that the grievance
committee took the Alvarados' side from
the beginning and that he worked on the
case without pay for a year. Lincoln said
the Alvarados never asked him for
receipts.
Campbell, Lincoln's lawyer, said his
client welcomes an FBI investigation.
"To my knowledge, they haven't
(investigated). We would love for them to
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investigate," he said. He added that
Lincoln's livelihood is at stake, and until
he's had his day in court, I'd hate to see
too much said about it."
Joanna Lippman, one of the Austin
lawyers representing Lago Vista and its
Police Department, said the plaintiffs in
the four remaining lawsuits would have to
hire another lawyer to proceed in federal
court. "If the lawsuits move forward," she
added, we can win these in court."
Copyright C 1999 Austin Amen can
Statesman
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